THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
precedent and fear of burdensome litigation relied upon to deny recovery); Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 3o R.I. 13, 73 Adt. 97 (199o) (same broad language and recovery
refused even though plaintiff's picture was used for advertising purposes); Atkinson v.
Doherty, i21 Mich. 372, 8o N.W. 285 (1899) (plaintiff refused an injunction where
deceased husband's name and picture were used to advertise defendant's product).
But see Pavesich v. New Eng. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S.E. 68 (i9o5) (plaintiff
recovered for unauthorized use of his picture in defendant's advertisement); Kunz V.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918) (another advertising case in which plaintiff
recovered); Foster-MilburnCo. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909) (plaintiff
recovered for unauthorized use of his name as endorsement of defendant'S product).
Cf. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (plaintiff recovered for defendant's placarding him as a debtor-not an advertising case); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,
I5 La.479,39 So.499 (1905) (police inspector enjoined from placing innocent plaintiff's
picture in rogue's gallery); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194
(193o) (plaintiff recovered for publication of picture of his deceased deformed child).
Probably the most cogent argument against the recognition of any right of privacy
is that such recognition will endanger the freedom of the press. See Hillnman v. Star
Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (i9ii). But this freedom extends only
to the dissemination of matters of public interest, and the experience of New York
courts has shown that such matters are easily distinguishable from advertising. See
Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal, 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y.S. 780 (191o); Moser v. Press
Pub. Co., 59 Misc. 78, 1o9 N.Y.S. 963 (i9o8). And these courts have construed the
phrase "purposes of trade" as applying only to the sale or publication of matters not of
public interest. Humiston v. Universal Film Co., i89 App. Div. 4 C7, 178 N.Y.S. 752
(1919); Colyer v. Fox, 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (914); cf. Binns v. Vitagraph
Co., 21o N.Y. 51, 1O3 N.E. i1o8 (1913); Blumenthal v. PictureClassics, 235 App. Div.
570, 257 N.Y.S. 8oo (1932). On the other hand where the plaintiff's picture or name
has been used in a publication for advertising purposes, he has been allowed to recover.
Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 139 Misc. 290, 248 N.Y.S. 359 (193I); D'Altomonte v. N. Y. Herald, 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1913); Eliot v. Jones, 66
Misc. 95, 120 N.Y.S. 989 (IgIo).
Finally, the threat of unduly burdensome litigation has not been borne out. In the
thirty-three years since the statute was passed, New York courts have been obliged to
decide some twenty-odd cases. In view of the more clearly-defined need for protection
of a right of privacy in advertising and trade purpose cases and of its demonstrated
ease of application, the way for legislative or judicial action in other states seems free
from the preconceived difficulties of the older cases.
Torts-Death Statutes-Liability of Telephone Company for Failure in Service[New York].-Unable to obtain a response from the central operator of the defendant
company, the plaintiff, a subscriber, was delayed in reaching his physician in attendance upon his sick child. The child died. Alleging that the child would not have died
it there had been no delay, plaintiff sued under the Decedent Estate Law (Cahill's
N.Y. Cons. L. 1930, c. 13, art. 5), which provides that the next of kin of a decedent
has a cause of action for wrongful death against the one who "would have been liable
to an action in favor of the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued."

RECENT CASES
(§ 130). Held, (i) the telephone company should not be liable for injuries resulting
from failure of service since it did not have notice of so indefinite a risk; (2) the Decedent Estate Law does not provide a remedy, since defendant would not have been
liable to deceased had she survived, for her injury would have been merely pain and
distress. No recovery. Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E. (2d)
434 (1936).
There are many legalistic approaches to the problem of a telephone company's
liability for failure in service. It might be disputed, for example, whether or not the
proximate cause of the death was not the failure but only the illness, the failure merely
obstructing the intervening agencies necessary to the cure as would a flat tire on the
physician's automobile. Cf. 46 Yale L. J. 167, x69-70 (1936). It is contended that the
duty to make connections is a contract duty, and hence that there can be no liability
unless the company has notice of the specific illness. But the defendant's failure has
made it impossible to give such notice. Clay, The Liability of a Telephone Company,
i Va. L. Rev. 337, 339 (1914); 46 Yale L. J. 167, 168-69 (1936). In the telegraph cases
notice of the specific emergency is a prerequisite to liability for delay. Williams V.
Western Union Tel. Co., 136 N.C. 59; 48 S.E. 559 (19o4), annotated in i Am. Eng.
Ann. Cas. 359 (19o6). Again, even if the duty is a tort duty, it might be disputed
whether or not the injury is sufficiently foreseeable to the company's employees to
render the company liable. These concepts and others similar are useful in some cases
because they neatly express the difference between the preceding cases which allowed
recovery and those which denied it, and because they point out the characteristics
which must be examined in the facts of any particular case in order to classify it with
similar cases. In borderline cases like the principal case, however, the concepts are
not at all useful as tools for decision because, since the facts are borderline, similar
characteristics can be found in decisions on both sides. Moreover, their use here works
affirmative mischief because it tends to discourage analysis of competing social advantages.
The best insight into the policy of the telephone cases will be gained by comparison
with the water company cases, in which no recovery is granted for fire losses resulting
from inadequate water pressure. Mock Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 16o, 159
N.E. 896 (1928). The reasons for immunizing the water companies are (i) since fire
is the only risk and fire insurance is very common among land owners, it is as easy for
the subscriber to insure as for the company, and there will be double coverage in many
cases; (2) a single failure might result in enormous liability by the spread of fire. In
the telephone cases these reasons are inapplicable because (i) the risk is more extensive than in the water cases, involving at least illness, fire, and burglary, and hence is
less commonly and less easily insured against by the telephone subscribers; (2) the
possible recovery from the company for any single failure will normally be slight and
rigidly limited. Indeed if a single failure should result in widespread losses, approximating those in the water cases, recovery might be denied by the same policy, even
though granted in the usual case. For instance, business losses, especially in a general
breakdown of telephone service, may reach gigantic proportions. This could be a factor
in a denial of recovery for business losses.
There are many arguments of "general social expediency" which support the telephone company's liability. The telephone is advertised as an emergency instrument,
and subscribers pay for it and rely on it as such. Recovery from the telephone corn-
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pany would provide an efficient method for distributing losses which may be staggering
to the individuals upon whom they fall, especially in cases of fire or of death of breadwinners. It is hard to believe that the amount of recovery would significantly affect
the resources of telephone companies or even force them to increase their rates. But
see 46 Yale L.J. 167, 171-72 (i936). If business losses are held not recoverable, not
only because the possible recovery might be very large as suggested above, but also
because financial protection of businesses is usually not as necessary as financial protection of individuals and because risk of business loss by delay may be anticipated and
often avoided or hedged against, the possible liability should be relatively slight. And
the threat of liability may have a tendency to improve telephone service. On the
other hand, if liability is imposed, the danger of faked suits is a very real one. See
Clay, The Liability of a Telephone Company, i Va. L. Rev. 337 (1914) (discussing
many cases). The difficulty of producing enough evidence to avoid a directed verdict
for the company would be slight, and the likelihood of a favorable verdict from publicutility-conscious juries would be a great temptation. If the court in the principal case
implicitly compared the danger of faked suits with the advantages suggested and
considered the former more important, its decision should not be criticized.
That the court considered it extremely undesirable to hold against the telephone
companies is apparent in its strained construction of the Decedent Estate Law.
While the words of § 13o taken out of context seem to lead to the construction adopted
it is clear from the whole act that it was intended to create a new category of liability
which will reimburse families and dependents for damage sustained by them through
the loss of the deceased. Cahill's N.Y. Cons. L. 193o, c. 13, § 132 (fixing measure of
damages as the injury to the plaintiff); see Littlevood v. Mayor, 89 N.Y. 24 (1882) (almost identical death act). The essential distinction between the cause of action provided for and that in favor of the deceased is that the former arises only upon death.
Since the death is an undoubted injury to the plaintiffs, it is unreasonable to suppose
that the legislature intended to require injury to the decedent in addition to death.
Littlewood v. Mayor, 89 N.Y. 24 (1882); Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 65 (2d ed.
1913). Cf. note on the principal case in 3i Ill. L. Rev. 535 (1936). Statutes which are
designed to preserve (in contrast to "create") causes of action which had already arisen
before death are known as survival statutes. There the defendants are injured only in
the sense that the estate is not as large as it would have been if the decreased had recovered for his injury. Confusion of the two types has often been roundly criticized.
8o U. of Pa. L. Rev. 993 (1932); McCormick, Damages 336 (I935); 5 Sutherland,
Damages § 126o (4 th ed. by Berryman 1916).
Trusts-Liability of Trustee to Cestuis for Failure to Share Receipts from Common
Debtor-[New York].-The plaintiffs were holders of notes issued by a German corporation pursuant to a trust indenture naming the defendant trustee for the benefit of
the note-holders. The notes were fully secured by collateral on deposit with the defendant's agency in Germany. German moratorium laws prevented payment by the
corporation of the interest and the principal, and made impossible the removal of the
collateral to New York. The defendant received a substantial amount of money from
the corporation in satisfaction of a major portion of an unsecured debt due to the defendant as a bank. The plaintiffs sued to remove the defendant as trustee and to re-

